Sex Discrimination in Newscasting by Gielow, Leslie S.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 84 Issue 3 
1985 
Sex Discrimination in Newscasting 
Leslie S. Gielow 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Communications Law Commons, and the Law 
and Gender Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Leslie S. Gielow, Sex Discrimination in Newscasting, 84 MICH. L. REV. 443 (1985). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/8 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NOTES 
Sex Discrimination in Newscasting 
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 customer prefer-
ence is generally not a justification for sexually discriminatory employ-
ment decisions.2 According to one court, "[I]t would be totally 
anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of cus-
tomers to determine whether ... sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, 
it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to 
overcome."3 Thus an international corporation cannot refuse to hire a 
female officer, despite its claim that it will lose its South American 
client base.4 Similarly, an airline cannot refuse to hire men because its 
passengers prefer female stewardesses, 5 and an armored car company 
cannot refuse to hire female drivers because its customers feel that 
only men give the aura of security.6 
Current practice in the television industry, however, continues to 
incorporate public preference into employment decisions through the 
use of viewer surveys, 7 which measure viewer reactions to individual 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1982) [hereinafter called title VII]. 
2. See EEOC Guidelines for Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(l)(iii) 
(1985) (prohibiting sex discrimination based on the preferences of co-workers, clients, or custom-
ers); Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.) ("Customer preference 
may be taken into account only when it is based on the company's inability to perform the 
primary function or service it offers."), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); see also Gerdom v. 
Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[G]ender-based discrimination cannot 
be upheld on the basis of customer preferences unrelated to abilities to perform the job.") (citing 
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981)), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1074 
(1983). 
3. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 
950 (1971); see also Edwards, Sex Discrimination Under Title VII: Some Unresolved Issues, 24 
LAB. L.J. 411, 418-19 (1973): 
The ... compelling reason [why social mores should not easily be received as justification 
for sex discrimination] is that societal norms cannot be presumed to be ·~ust" merely be-
cause they exist. In the area of employment discrimination, Congress has declared that 
certain practices must give way to the national policy of anti-discrimination; thus, local 
norms and customs cannot be allowed to override this legislative judgment. 
4. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981). 
5. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 950 (1971). 
6. EEOC Dec. No. 70-11, 1973 EEOC Dec. (CCH) ~ 6025 (1969). But cf Dothard v. Rawl-
inson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1977) (a state may refuse to hire a woman as a guard in its male, 
maximum security unclassified penitentiary because of the security risk that inmates might as-
sault her "because she was a woman"). 
7. See A. WESTIN, NEWSWATCH 121-26 (1982); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 
868, 873-74 (W.D. Mo. 1983), a.ffd. in relevant part and revd. in part, 166 F.2d 1205, 1209 (8th 
Cir. 1985) (affirming as to Craft's title VII and Equal Pay Act claims, but reversing the trial 
court's grant of a new trial on her fraud claim, holding that Craft failed to state a cause of 
action), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986). 
443 
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newscasters. 8 The public, according to many media personnel, evalu-
ates female newscasters by different criteria from those used to judge 
their male counterparts.9 In response to perceived public expectation, 
networks treat them differently as well. This different treatment does 
not stem from the usual form of customer preference stereotype -
that the public prefers men over women in the job. 10 Instead, it arises 
from the perception of television broadcasters that the public prefers 
women with certain traits - for example, youth, 11 beauty, 12 and 
nonaggressive behavior13 - but that the public does not demand these 
qualities of male newscasters, or at least not to the same degree as of 
women. 14 This type of discrimination among members of one sex15 
based upon impermissible16 stereotyped expectations is called sex-plus 
8. Viewer surveys can be done on paper, over the phone, or in person in "focus groups," 
where viewers react to videotapes of specific newscasters. These surveys are used to predict 
movements in the ratings by identifying audience preference. See Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 876. 
Viewer surveys are to be distinguished from ratings. Two private companies, Arbitron and 
Nielson, measure audience size or "ratings," issuing ratings several times a year in a publication 
known as the "ratings book." Advertisers place ads according to the ratings in order to reach the 
largest share of their desired market. Consequently, small changes in the ratings translate into 
substantial increases or decreases in station revenue. See Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 876. 
Like viewer surveys, ratings should not provide a means to evade the requirement that a 
television station not cater to sex-stereotyped customer preference in newscasting employment 
decisions. However, ratings present a more difficult proof problem because they do not measure 
responses to individual newscasters and thus tend to blur sex-role expectations. 
9. See B. ROLLIN, AM I GETI'ING PAID FOR THIS? (1982); J. SAVITCH, ANCHORWOMAN 
(1982); J. WOODRUFF, THIS IS JUDY WOODRUFF AT THE WHITE HOUSE (1982); Henry, Re-
quiem for TV's Gender Gap?, TIME, Aug. 22, 1983, at 57; N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1983, at 1, col. 1. 
10. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant 
maintained that South American businessmen would refuse to transact business with a woman); 
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir.) (defendant claimed that 
customers prefer female flight attendents), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). 
11. See N.Y. Times, supra note 9 ("It is a fact oflife that men have an easier time of it in this 
business in terms of aging than women do.") (quoting the president of a news consulting firm). 
12. Id. ("[Appearance is] a heck of a lot more of a factor in hiring a woman than a man.") 
(quoting a news consultant); see also Bar-Tai & Saxe, Physical Attractiveness and Its Relationship 
to Sex-Role Stereotyping, 2 SEX ROLES 123 (1976). 
13. See note 63 infra and accompanying text. 
14. See N.Y. Times, supra note 9 (quoting testimony of a news consultant to say that women 
are criticized more by the audience for their appearance than are men). 
15. It is questionable whether only "some" women suffer from stereotype-based employment 
practices that discriminate among women. Studies show that employer practices reinforce ste-
reotypes held by society, employers, and women themselves. See Arrow, Economic Dimensions of 
Occupational Segregation: Comment I. in WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 233, 234 (M. Blaxall & 
B. Reagan eds. 1976); Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of 
Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REV. 345, 407 (1980) (a woman forced to conform to 
role expectations is "doomed to play a part in reinforcing the vitality of such criteria in her own 
eyes, the eyes of other women, and in the eyes of her employer and co-workers"). 
16. Not all sex-stereotyped expectations are impermissible as the basis of employment ac-
tions under title VII. Some grooming requirements will survive title VII scrutiny. See notes 52-
59 infra and accompanying text; Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 
1977) ("Employer grooming codes requiring different hair lengths for men and women bear such 
a negligible relationship to the purposes of Title VII that we cannot conclude they were a target 
of the Act."). 
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discrimination.17 It is as much a violation ohitle VII as discrimina-
tion that prohibits an entire sex from performing the job.18 
Basing newscaster employment decisions on public preference is 
potentially discriminatory. However, courts have failed to question 
the use of viewer surveys, 19 which employers use to measure this pref-
erence. 20 For example, in Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 21 Christine Craft 
alleged that her treatment22 while employed as co-anchor of the 
nightly news at KMBC-TV in Kansas City, Missouri, as well as her 
subsequent demotion23 from the position, constituted sex discrimina-
17. See generally Part I infra. 
18. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); notes 39-41 infra and accom-
panying text. 
19. It makes no difference that the viewer preference is not speculative but is, in fact, docu-
mented in the form of a survey. In the seminal case rejecting customer preference as a defense to 
discrimination in employment, Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), the airline introduced a validly conducted survey that demon-
strated that 79% of airline passengers preferred female flight attendants. For a discussion of the 
survey conducted by Pan American, see the opinion of the district court in this case at 311 F. 
Supp. 559, 565 (S.D. Fla. 1970). 
20. See Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1216 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. 
Ct. 285 (1986); see also Goodman v. Washington Radio, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1843, 
31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 'il 33,375 (D.D.C. 1982); Haines v. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, 32 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1113, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 'il 31,650 (D.R.I. 1980). In 
Goodman, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim that she was dismissed because of her pregnancy 
and pointed to viewer survey findings that she lacked requisite on-air personality. The court in 
Haines rejected a male television anchor's claim that he was dismissed because he helped his wife 
in a title VII suit against the station. The court found that the station based its dismissal on the 
results of a viewer survey, which the court admitted was open to legitimate challenge due to its 
subjectivity; it refused, however, to examine whether viewer surveys could permissibly be used in 
employment decisions. In these cases, the finding that the employment action was based on a 
viewer survey effectively dispelled the inference that the employment decision was due to the 
particular condition or action. Nevertheless, both courts appeared to assume that viewer surveys 
and ratings are unconditionally legitimate employment criteria. 
21. 572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Mo. 1983), ajfd. in relevant part and revd. in part, 766 F.2d 1205 
(8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986). 
22. Craft contended that the appearance standards imposed upon her were more harsh than 
those imposed upon men. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1210. These requirements included extensive 
makeup counseling and a "clothing calendar" to insure that Craft did not wear the same outfit 
more often than once every three weeks. 766 F.2d at 1209, 1214; Henry, supra note 9, at 57; see 
Plaintiff's Conclusions of Law at 40, Craft ("Plaintiff's performance was judged exclusively or to 
a significant extent according to her appearance while male newscasters were judged primarily or 
entirely based upon their journalistic skills and abilities."). But see Defendant's Proposed Find-
ings of Fact at 20, Craft ("There was no policy of harassment of female on-air newscasters be-
cause of their appearance. . . . Male on-air newscasters were also criticized on appearance, dress, 
and makeup."). 
23. Craft was reassigned to the position of reporter. As well as alleging a title VII violation, 
she also claimed that the reassignment constituted a constructive discharge. According to the 
trial court, this contention was "untenable on both the law and the facts." Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 
879. The trial court found that the evidence did not support a finding that either of the elements 
of constructive discharge were present. Plaintiff's working conditions did not become so intolera-
ble that she had no choice but to leave, nor were any of defendant's actions taken with the intent 
to force plaintiff's resignation. 572 F. Supp. at 876, 879. The court of appeals affirmed the 
district court's ruling that Craft was not constructively discharged. The appellate court refused 
to rule that the district court was "clearly erroneous" in finding that, as a matter of fact, Craft 
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tion24 in violation of title VII. Metromedia argued that Craft's treat-
ment and demotion were legitimately based on viewer surveys 
indicating that she was negatively perceived by the Kansas City audi-
ence. 25 Without considering whether the surveys themselves reflected 
impermissible sex stereotypes, the district court found reliance on 
them "reasonable and appropriate"26 and the resulting employment 
actions nondiscriminatory.27 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit treated this determination as a finding of fact and upheld it as 
not clearly erroneous,28 thus refusing to reach beyond the confines set 
by the district court and question the propriety of using viewer surveys 
to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination.29 
This Note argues that the current judicial deference30 to viewer 
surveys used by television stations in newscasting employment deci-
sions is unwarranted. Part I explores how different treatment of wo-
had not been subjected to illegal discrimination or that the defendant had not acted with an 
intent to force her to resign from her job. 766 F.2d at 1217. 
24. According to Craft, she was told by the KMBC news director that she was being re· 
moved from her co-anchor position because she was "too old, too unattractive, and not deferen· 
tial to men." Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 878. The court of appeals accepted the district court's factual 
conclusion that the news director "said no such thing." 766 F.2d at 1212. 
Sex discrimination was only the first count in Craft's complaint. Count II alleged that de· 
fendant paid her less than similarly situated male employees in violation of the Equal Pay Act of 
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's acceptance of 
the jury verdict against Craft on her Equal Pay Act claim. Craft also alleged that the defendant 
made intentional, fraudulent misrepresentations to induce her to accept employment. The dis-
trict court set aside a jury award for Craft on this claim on the ground that it was excessive, and 
awarded a new trial. 572 F. Supp. at 881. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Craft had 
failed to establish an adequate case on the fraud count. 766 F.2d at 1207-08. Finally, Craft 
alleged that the defendant's actions toward her, even if otherwise lawful, were intended to injure 
her and therefore constituted a prima facie tort. This count was abandoned during the trial and 
was not submitted to the jury. 572 F. Supp. at 870. 
25. The defendant argued that the station controlled Craft's wardrobe and makeup because 
the reaction of "focus groups" to her appearance was "overwhelmingly negative." Craft, 766 
F.2d at 1209. The station later reassigned Craft because a subsequent survey found her trailing 
her competitors. 766 F.2d at 1209. 
26. 572 F. Supp. at 873. 
27. 572 F. Supp. at 876. Craft alleged a claim of disparate treatment, which required her to 
prove discriminatory intent on the part of her employer. See note 66 infra and accompanying 
text. Since the court found "no evidence that the survey was designed to effect the removal of 
plaintiff as co-anchor because of her sex or any other reason," 572 F. Supp. at 878, Craft was 
unable to establish the requisite intent. The district court thus disregarded a jury recommenda· 
tion that it rule for plaintiff, 572 F. Supp. at 870 (on a title VII claim the jury may sit only in an 
advisory capacity, FED. R. C1v. P. 39(c)), and held that Craft had no cause of action under title 
VII. 
28. 766 F.2d at 1216. 
29. 766 F.2d at 1217. See notes 84-91 infra and accompanying text. 
30. See, e.g., Craft, 166 F.2d 1205; Goodman v. Washington Radio, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 1843, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 33,375 (D.D.C. 1982) (failing to analyze validity of 
basing employment decisions on viewer surveys); Haines v. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, 32 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1113, 1116, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 31,650, at 19,764 (D.R.I. 
1980) ("One might legitimately challenge the reliability of a study of this kind, especially since it 
is so subjective. One might also question whether popularity is the best basis for selecting news-
casters. These are not my concerns."). 
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men newscasters constitutes sex-plus discrimination. Part II 
demonstrates that viewer surveys almost always reflect sexual stereo-
types that are impermissible under title VII, and argues that such 
surveys should be presumptively inadmissible as evidence to rebut a 
claim of sex discrimination. Indeed, mere use of these surveys may in 
and of itself establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. 
Part III contends that sex discrimination in the news industry re-
sulting from the use of viewer surveys cannot be justified under any of 
the recognized title VII defenses. Part IV discusses the policy consid-
erations involved in the use and scrutiny of viewer surveys. It con-
cludes that if courts are unwilling to prohibit the use of surveys 
generally as discriminatory per se, they should at least subject particu-
lar surveys that are challenged as discriminatory to judicial scrutiny. 
I. SEX-PLUS DISCRIMINATION: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 
A. Different Requirements for Male and Female News Personnel 
Sociological studies confirm that sex-role expectations pervade 
society.31 These societal stereotypes32 relate to an individual's abil-
31. See generally J. CHAFETZ, MAsCULINE/FEMININE OR HUMAN? AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF SEX ROLES (1974); L. DUBERMAN, GENDER AND SEX IN SOCIETY (1975); P. 
FILENE, HIM/HER/SELF: SEX ROLES IN MODERN AMERICA (1974); E. MACCOBY & C. JACK-
LIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES (1974); B. YORBURG, SEXUAL IDENTITY (1974). 
For a discussion of the nature and effects of sexual stereotyping in all areas of life, see gener-
ally S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); S. DE 
BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1952); B. FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963); K. MIL-
LETI, SEXUAL PoLmcs (1970). 
32. See Taub, supra note 15; Note, Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification: Defining 
Title VII's Evolving Enigma, Related Litigation Problems, and the Judicial Vision of Womanhood 
after Dothard v. Rawlinson, 5 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 107 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, 
Evolving Enigma]. 
Sociological studies indicate a high degree of societal consensus about the expected character-
istics of men and women. See Bem, The Measurement of Psychological Androgyny, 42 J. CON-
SULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 155, 157 (1974); Coser & Rokoff, Women in the 
Occupational World: Social Disruption and Conflict, 18 Soc. PROBS. 535, 540 (1971); see also 
Taub, supra note 15, at 413 n.317 (citing O'Leary, Some Attitudinal Barriers to Occupational 
Aspirations in Women, 81 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 809, 812 (1974)). 
Stereotyped views of proper sex roles are shared by men and women alike. In fact, women 
may be harsher critics of other women than men. See Goldberg, Are Women Prejudiced Against 
Women?, 5 TRANS-ACTION, Apr. 1968, at 28; N.Y. Times, supra note 9. However, the fact that 
sex-role assumptions are widely shared by members of the "victim" class does not legitimate 
them as employment criteria. Rather, it indicates that cultural assumptions will be more difficult 
to overcome because of the immense role contradictions experienced by those who do not con-
form. See Bern & Bern, Case Study of A Nonconscious Ideology: Training the Woman to Know 
Her Place, in BELIEFS, ATIITUDES AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 89-90 (D.J. Bern ed. 1970); Komarov-
sky, Cultural Contradictions and Sex Roles, 52 AMER. J. Soc. 184, 185 (1946); Laws, The Bell 
Telephone System: A Case Study, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE AT&T 
CASE 157, 163-64 (P. Wallace ed. 1976); Prather, Why Can't Women Be More Like Men: A 
Summary of the Sociopsychological Factors Hindering Women's Advancement in the Professions, 
15 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 172 (1971); Wolman & Frank, The Solo Woman in a Professional Peer 
Group, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 164, 169 (1975); see also Condry & Dyer, Fear of Success: 
Attribution of Cause to the Victim, 32 J. Soc. ISSUES 63, 75-79 (1976). 
Typical male qualities include "competence, rationality and assertion." Valued feminine at-
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ity,33 behavior,34 appearance,35 and dress.36 Role expectations result in 
negative reactions to those who do not conform37 and also result in 
tributes, which indicate the traditionally dependent female role, include social skills and graces, 
warmth, and emotional support. Taub, supra note 15, at 413; see also Powers, The Shifti11g 
Parameters of Affirmative Actio11: "Pragmatic" Paternalism i11 Sex-Based Employme11t Discrimi-
nation Cases, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1281 (1980). The Supreme Court has mentioned the depen-
dency stereotype in the constitutional context. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that statute treating widowers less favorably than widows 
is "the accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about females"). 
A second variation of the feminine dependency role is woman as an inherently sexual being, 
temptress and satisfier of desires. Her chief attribute under this model is sexual allure. See V. 
BULLOUGH & B. BULLOUGH, THE SUBORDINATE SEX 49 (1974); M. DALY, BEYOND Goo THE 
FATHER: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION (1973); Seidenberg, The Myth of 
the ''Evil" Female as Embodied in the Law, 2 J. ENVTL. L. 218 (1971); see also Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 345 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's claim 
that a female could be denied employment at an Alabama maximum security prison because her 
"very womanhood" would endanger prison security by provoking attack: "[T]his rationale re-
grettably perpetuates one of the most insidious of the old myths about women - that women, 
wittingly or not, are seductive sex objects."); c. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF 
WORKING WOMEN 83-99 (1979) (noting that courts have often been unwilling or reluctant to 
hold that sexual harassment of female employees by male supervisors constitutes sex discrimina-
tion, viewing the incidents as "biological" or "natural"); R. POWERS, THE NEWSCASTERS 168 
(1977) (noting the result of the view of women as sex objects in the field of newscasting: "The 
curious thing about women's ascendancy in television journalism is the degree of hostility they 
have encountered among critics as well as their male colleagues. . . . [M]any critics react as 
though women alone are the interlopers, as though the very prese11ce of a woman on a newscast 
constitutes a sellout to show business.") (emphasis in original). 
33. Two examples are the stereotypes "that men are less capable of assembling intricate 
equipment: that women are less capable of aggressive salesmanship." EEOC Guidelines on Dis-
crimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(l)(ii) (1985) (prohibiting employment deci-
sions on the basis of these stereotypes). 
34. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979) (invalidating "the State's preference for an 
allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife plays a dependent role"). 
35. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 352 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (M.D. Ga. 1972) 
("It is not unreasonable for an employer to expect differences in grooming between men and 
women .... "), affd. en bane, 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975). 
36. See Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977) (men expected to wear 
a tie); Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (women prohibited 
from wearing pants). 
37. Individuals are consistently rated as more competent in sex-appropriate capacities. See 
Deaux & Emswiller, Explanations of Successful Performance on Sex-Li11ked Tasks, 29 J. PER-
SONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 80 (1974); Etaugh, Cooley & Stern, Childre11's Causal Attribu-
tions of Female and Male Success and Failure, 108 J. PSYCHOLOGY 199 (1981); Gerdes & 
Kelman, Sex Discrimination: Effects of Sex-Role Inco11gruence, Evaluator Sex, and Stereotypes, 2 
BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 219 (1981). 
This is true also in the employment setting. See Cohen & Bunker, Subtle Effects of Sex Role 
Stereotypes on Recruiters' Hiring Decisions, 60 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 566 (1975) (finding that 
in simulated hiring situations, male applicants are preferred over equally qualified females for 
traditionally male jobs while females are preferred for traditionally female positions); Rosen & 
Jerdee, Effects of App/icallt's Sex and Difficulty of Job on Evaluatio11s of Candidates for Ma11age-
rial Positions, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 511 (1975) (finding that in simulated hiring situations 
male applicants for managerial positions are rated higher and accepted more frequently than 
equally qualified females, particularly for more demanding positions); Rosen & Jerdee, Influence 
of Sex Role Stereotypes on Personnel Decisions, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 9 (1974) (finding 
bank managers less likely to promote females, offer them training programs, or accept their per-
sonnel assessments). 
Role expectations also affect an individual's evaluation of his or her own competence in vari-
ous employment capacities. See Betz & Hackett, The Relationship of Career-Related Self-Effi-
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individuals being evaluated on different criteria according to sex. For 
example, personality and appearance are often more important factors 
in evaluating women than they are in evaluating men in the same 
situation. 38 
Employment decisions based on these sexual stereotypes generally 
violate title VII. 39 It is not necessary for a title VII violation that one 
sex be completely excluded from employment opportunity. Under the 
sex-plus theory,40 an employer may not discriminate among members 
of one sex on the basis of sexual stereotypes, or "plus factors," which 
are illegal under title VIl.4 1 
cacy Expectations to Perceived Career Options in College Women and Men, 28 J. COUNSELING 
PSYCHOLOGY 399 (1981) (study finds that women, unlike men, rate themselves less proficient at 
skills required in professions in which they have been historically underrepresented); Shaw, Dif-
ferential Impact of Negative Stereotyping in Employee Selection, 25 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 
333 (1972) (finding that where information available to a decisionmaker is limited or ambiguous, 
sex stereotypes have a greater relative impact than other "negative" data). 
38. See Cecil, Paul & Olins, Perceived Importance of Selected Variables Used to Evaluate 
Male and Female Job Applicants, 26 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 397 (1973); note 12 supra. 
39. The statute provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to fail 
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). 
The statute has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as "intended to strike at the entire spec-
trum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." County of 
Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981) (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power 
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 705 (1978)). In Gunther, the Supreme Court professed to be following 
legislative intent: "As Congress itself has indicated, a 'broad approach' to the definition of equal 
employment opportunity is essential to overcoming and undoing the effect of discrimination." 
452 U.S. at 178 (citing S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1964)). The original legislative 
intent, however, is far from clear, because sex was included as a prohibited classification on the 
last day of debate. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., !st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2401 (describing purpose as eliminating "discrimination in employ-
ment based [only] on race, color, religion, or national origin"). But see H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 4749, 4754-55 (noting that 
bill covers policies adversely affecting pregnant workers); H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 5, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2137, 2141 ("Discrimination against 
women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment practices and is to be ac-
corded the same degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful discrimination."). See 
generally Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 
TEXAS L. REV. 1035 (1977) (discussing legislative history and judicial interpretation of bona fide 
occupational qualification defense); Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109 (1971) (discussing the legislative 
purposes of title VII). 
40. The Supreme Court, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per 
curiam), established that "sex-plus" employment requirements may violate title VII. 
41. Courts have interpreted impermissible "plus factors" to fall within one of the following 
three categories: (1) "immutable" characteristics; (2) characteristics that, while mutable, involve 
fundamental rights such as the right to have children or marry; and (3) characteristics that, 
although mutable, significantly affect the employment opportunities or the terms and conditions 
of employment afforded one sex. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609 n.15 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 416 (1983). 
The courts that have required the plus factor to be a fundamental right or immutable charac-
teristic have also mentioned that the determining element of an employment requirement is its 
effect on job opportunity. These courts found that only immutable characteristics or fundamen-
tal rights had a significant enough effect to warrant imposition of title VII liability. See, e.g., 
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Cases involving airline requirements for flight attendants illustrate 
the difference between discriminating against an entire sex, on the one 
hand, and against only certain members of one sex, on the other. In 
terms of the former, an airline cannot hire only female flight atten-
dants, even if it demonstrates that this practice is important to its im-
age and that customers prefer that men not perform the job.42 In 
terms of the latter, an airline cannot require that its female employees 
be unmarried,43 or below a certain age,44 unless its male employees are 
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1975) (en bane) 
(allowing "classifications by sex ... which do not pose distinct employment disadvantages for 
one sex") (quoting Dodge v. Giant Food, 488 F.2d 1333, 1336-37 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam)); 
Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting with ap-
proval Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D.D.C. 1972)); see also Gerdom v. 
Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1982) (declaring that employment standards 
that affect personal appearance are permissible only if they "do not ••• deprive either sex of 
employment opportunities, and ... are even-handedly applied to employees of both sexes"), cert. 
denied, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983). 
Some courts, under the sex-plus theory, have required that an employee subject to a stereo-
type demonstrate that a similarly situated employee of the opposite sex actually received different 
treatment. See, e.g., Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
844 (1977); Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 
414 U.S. 970 (1973). Consequently, flight attendants released because of a "no-marriage" rule, 
Stroud, 544 F.2d at 893-94, or a "quit-at-32" rule, Loper v. American Airlines, 582 F.2d 956 (5th 
Cir. 1978), could not establish a title VII case, since there were, at the time of the policy, no male 
flight attendants. See Loper, 582 F.2d at 958 ("Thus, while the airline's '32' and 'no marriage' 
rules favored certain females, younger women and those who were unmarried, over others, plain-
tiffs did not receive different treatment on account of their sex; '[m]en were not favored over 
women; they simply were not involved in the functioning of the policy.'") (quoting Stroud, 544 
F.2d at 893). 
More recent cases, however, have rejected the necessity of a comparative standard. See, e.g., 
Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d at 607-08; Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522, 524 (6th 
Cir. 1977) ("A rule which applies only to women, with no counterpart applicable to men, may 
not be the basis for depriving a female employee who is otherwise qualified of her right to contin-
ued employment."); Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364, 370 (6th Cir.) (rejecting em-
ployer's contention that for a title VII violation "there must be men and women similarly 
situated who are treated in a disparate manner"), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977); EEOC v. 
Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. at 609 n.15 (concluding that if a hypothetical male would have 
received different treatment, a prima facie case of sex discrimination is established: "The Court 
is persuaded ... that had [the company) employed male [lobby] attendants in May 1976 defen-
dants surely would not have required these men to wear the [sexually revealing] Bicentennial 
costume."); Skelton v. Balzano, 424 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D.D.C. 1976) (Plaintiff will prevail, 
despite the fact that the promotion at issue was given to another woman, if she can show that if 
she "had been a man she would not have been treated in the same manner ..• .''). 
42. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 950 (1971); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 294 (N.D. Tex. 1981) 
(desire of airline to project image of "feminine spirit, fun, and sex appeal" does not justify hiring 
only women as flight attendants, whom the airline dressed in hotpants and high boots). 
43. See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 99 (1971). 
44. For example, an airline cannot force its female flight attendants to quit at age 32 if simi-
larly situated males are not required to do likewise. See Loper v. American Airlines, 582 F.2d 
956 (5th Cir. 1978) (but finding no title VII violation since there were no comparably situated 
male flight attendants); see also note 41 supra (demonstrating that a comparable standard is no 
longer necessary to establish a title VII violation). Furthermore, age is clearly an immutable 
characteristic that should qualify as an illegal plus factor even under a strict sex-plus theory. See 
note 41 supra. 
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subject to the same requirements. Unless uniformly applied, these two 
criteria constitute illegal sex-plus discrimination, i.e., discrimination 
against only women who possess these traits, even though not all wo-
men are disqualified by the requirements. The quintessential example 
of an illegal "plus factor" is a requirement that-employees not be preg-
nant. While facially neutral because all employees are subject to it, the 
requirement in fact only disqualifies women. The requirement thus 
discriminates among women on the basis of a sexual characteristic 
that, absent a health or safety rationale,4s cannot validly be 
considered. 46 
Indeed, most courts have interpreted sexual stereotypes concerning 
ability or proper sex-role behavior to be illegal plus factors.47 Most 
physical appearance requirements are also illegal under title VII. Un-
less a particular appearance is essential to job performance,48 an em-
ployer cannot fire or demote an employee because she wears glasses,49 
exceeds a strict weight limit, so or refuses to wear a sexually provoca-
tive uniform.s1 
45. See, e.g., Condit v. United Air Lines, 558 F.2d 1176, 1176 (4th Cir. 1977) (airline's "go-
when-you-know" policy, which required stewardesses to discontinue flying as soon as they were 
aware that they were pregnant, held consistent with the carrier's duty to exercise the highest 
degree of care for the passenger's safety), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978); Harriss v. Pan Amer-
ican World Airways, 437 F. Supp. 413, 419-24 (N.D. Cal. 1977) ("go-when-you-know" policy 
held a good faith effort by the airline to ensure flight attendants' maximum emergency capabili-
ties), ajfd. in part, revd. in part, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980). 
46. See, e.g., Maclennan v. American Airlines, 440 F. Supp. 466, 470-72 (E.D. Va. 1977) 
(invalidating airline's "go-when-you-know" policy because although neutral on its face, the pol-
icy has an adverse effect upon women). 
47. See, e.g., Skelton v. Balzano, 424 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D.D.C. 1976) (Male director 
cannot refuse to advance female employee because of his dislike for "pushy women." Sex dis-
crimination may sti11 be present even though one woman is advanced over another: "It is enough 
to show ••. that if plaintiff had been a man she would not have been treated in the same manner 
... . ");cf EEOC Dec. No. 70-198, 1973 EEOC Dec. (CCH) 11 6087 (1969) (employer cannot 
discharge black worker because his manner was self-confident rather than submissive). 
The EEOC Guidelines proscribe the following employment practices: 
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of the compara-
tive employment characteristics of women in general. For example, the assumption that the 
turnover rate among women is higher than among men. 
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes 
. . . . The principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis 
of individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the 
group. 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(l) (1985). 
Courts have consistently required that an individual be allowed to prove nonconformity with 
a sexual stereotype and thus capability for the job. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1969) (quoted with approval in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 
U.S. 321, 333 (1977)). See generally Note, The Mandate of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964: To Treat Women as Individuals, 59 GEO. L.J. 221 (1970). 
48. See cases cited at note 42 supra. 
49. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973), ajfd. in part and vacated 
in part on other grounds, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). 
50. Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 
1074 (1983). 
51. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
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Personal grooming requirements mark the current line between 
permissible and impermissible employment actions under title VII. 
Courts have upheld some grooming requirements as reasonable52 even 
though they clearly enforce general community expectations regarding 
how a member of a certain sex will appear. For example, an employer 
can require that both sexes wear "proper business attire," although 
common societal norms interpret different types of clothing as appro-
priate for men and women.53 Similarly, an employer can require male 
employees to wear short hair54 or ties,55 while not imposing the same 
requirement on women. However, a facially neutral standard cannot 
be applied more strictly to one sex than the other.56 Furthermore, an 
appearance requirement cannot embody offensive57 or demeaning58 
52. See, e.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977); Barker v. Taft 
Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 
(2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975). 
53. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 604 F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(acknowledging the employer's right to require "appropriate business attire" for both men and 
women, although striking down a dress code that required only women employees to wear 
uniforms), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868, 877 
(W.D. Mo. 1983), affd. in relevant part and revd. in part, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986). 
54. All seven circuits that have addressed the hair length issue have concluded that short 
hair requirements for men do not constitute sex discrimination under title VII. See Barker v. 
Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977); Earwood v. Continental Southeastern 
Lines, 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 
1976) (per curiam); Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. 
Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en bane); Baker v. California Land 
Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, 
488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
Some courts and individual judges, however, have opined that male short hair requirements 
violate title VII. See Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d at 402 (McCree, J., dissenting); 
Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, 539 F.2d at 1351 (Winter, J., dissenting); Willing-
ham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973), }'acated en bane, 507 F.2d 1084 
(5th Cir. 1975); Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Donohue 
v. Shoe Corp. of Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Roberts v. General Mills, 337 F. 
Supp. 1057 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 
55. E.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977). 
56. See Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868, 877 (W.D. Mo. 1983) ("This court 
recognizes that otherwise permissible appearance and grooming standards could be unlawful if 
invidiously applied."}, affd. in relevant part and revd. in part, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985}, cert. 
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986). 
57. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981} (employer cannot 
require female to wear sexually revealing costume). 
58. Exactly what constitutes a "demeaning" stereotype remains unclear. One court has held 
that requiring female bank employees to wear a uniform, while allowing similarly situated males 
to wear "proper business attire," is demeaning because the public will naturally assume that the 
uniformed females hold a lower job position. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Lonn Assn., 604 
F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980). 
Another court, however, has rejected an employee's claim that requiring females to wear 
skirts, as opposed to any sort of pants, in an executive office demonstrates a "sexist, chauvinist 
attitude in employment" and "perpetuates the stereotype that men are more capable than women 
of making business <lecisions." Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1390·92 
(W.D. Mo. 1979) ("Employment decisions ... based on either dress codes or policies regarding 
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stereotypes. Thus only a limited range of dress and grooming require-
ments are considered "reasonable" under title VII. 59 
Comments by various news industry personnel indicate that sex-
plus discrimination against female anchors does, in fact, occur fre-
quently. According to one news consultant, "Women in this business 
face pressures that men do not, but those pressures often stem from 
the public."60 Others admit, "[Appearance is] a heck of a lot more of 
hair length are more closely related to the company's choice of how to run its business rather 
than to its obligation to provide equal employment opportunities."). But see EEOC Dec. No. 77-
36, 1983 EEOC Dec. (CCH) 11 6588 (1977) (female employee not required to wear a revealing 
costume where similarly situated males are not required to wear the same); EEOC Dec. No. 70-
920, 1973 EEOC Dec. (CCH) 1[ 6156 (1970) (finding that women must be allowed to wear pants 
to work). 
59. The future expansion or contraction of this "reasonable" category will depend upon 
which stereotypes courts view as significantly detrimental to job opportunity. See, e.g., Fagan v. 
National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (condemning, in dictum, 
"'outmoded and unjustifiable sex stereotypes'") (quoting Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. 
Supp. 402, 403 (D.D.C. 1972)). It is plaintifi's responsibility to demonstrate that a sexual stereo-
type underlies an employment decision and that the stereotype poses a threat to job opportunity. 
See Note, Evolving Enigma, supra note 32, at 111 (footnote omitted): 
[Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334-36 (1977), in which the Supreme Court held that 
a woman could not perform the job of security guard because of her "very womanhood"] 
may suggest that sexuality and patriarchal myths will continue to shroud a woman's status 
as an individual absent a litigation effort which consciously identifies and builds a record to 
challenge each gender-based assumption found in an adversary's argument. 
At present, certain personal appearance regulations are viewed as more within the scope of em-
ployer discretion than injurious to employee job opportunity. See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, 
Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868, 877 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (courts have taken a "realistic and common-sense 
approach" by permitting different grooming requirements for men and women), affd. in relevant 
part and revd. in part, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986). How-
ever, a concrete demonstration of injury to employee job opportunity resulting from such stereo-
types could reverse the "common sense" presumption. See Taub, supra note 15, at 387-88: 
[Personal appearance requirements represent] a company decision to project a certain im-
age, [however] not all images are permissible. A company presumably would not be permit-
ted to post posters throughout its premises advertising itself as dedicated to the suppression 
of blacks, nor would it be able to require all Negro employees to wear blackface. The prob-
lem is thus one of recognizing how potent and how detrimental are the messages conveyed, a 
matter perhaps best handled on a case-by-case basis. An ad hoc approach, however, will 
only succeed in eliminating sex based barriers to equal employment opportunity if judicial 
concepts of discriminatory behavior are expanded. 
Documentation of the adverse effect of sexual stereotypes in the workplace should also reduce 
the alarmingly prevalent attitude that the dangers of sex discrimination are exaggerated and the 
imposition of liability somehow unfair. See Weiner, Stewart Doubts Supreme Court Ruling on 
Executive Privilege, HARV. L. REC., Mar. 23, 1973, at 1, 15 (" '[T]he female of the species has 
the best of both worlds.' ... The equal protection clause can be used to attack laws that unrea-
sonably discriminate against women while saving some, such as exemption from conscription, 
which favor them.") (quoting Speech by Justice Potter Stewart at Harvard University's Lowell 
House (Mar. 13, 1973)); Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 879 (pointing out "one notable and ironic excep-
tion" to Craft's equal employment treatment: "but for the fact that she is female, plaintiff would 
not have been hired as a co-anchor ..• regardless of her other abilities"). 
Even prominent public officials can be heard to articulate sex-role assumptions, indicating 
that the seriousness of these stereotypes is still often underestimated. See, e.g., Thomas, A Rea-
gan Crony on the Line, TIME, Jan. 9, 1984, at 20 (Director of the United States Information 
Agency Charles Wick stated that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher disapproved of the 
United States invasion of Grenada "because she is a woman."). 
60. Henry, supra note 9, at 57 (quoting ABC News Vice President David Burke). 
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a factor in hiring a woman than a man,"61 and "It is a fact of life that 
men have an easier time of it in this business in terms of aging than 
women do. " 62 Finally, a female newscaster complains, "If I'm as ag-
gressive as I think I should be in a particular situation, a lot of people 
get annoyed or write in and ask me, 'Don't I know how ladies be-
have?' " 63 These comments suggest that women news personnel are 
subject to different criteria than are their male counterparts. Specifi-
cally, women not meeting certain age, appearance, and demeanor re-
quirements may lose their jobs (or not get hired at all), while men with 
the same characteristics do not suffer any adverse consequences. This 
differential treatment, if proven, should be considered a violation of 
title VII unless justified under one of the statute's traditional 
defenses. 64 
B. The Prima Facie Case 
There are two theories under which a plaintiff may establish a 
prima facie case of sex discrimination under title VII: disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact. Which theory the plaintiff chooses will 
depend upon the facts of the case - on whether she wants to argue 
that her employer intentionally treated her differently because of her 
sex or, instead, that a facially neutral employment policy has an ad-
verse impact on members of her sex. 
1. Disparate Treatment 
Under the disparate treatment theory, 65 a plaintiff must show that 
her employer intentionally treated her differently because of her sex or 
some sex-related characteristic. 66 The emphasis is on the employer's 
motive. The plaintiff's initial burden is not onerous. 67 To establish a 
prima facie case, she must merely produce sufficient evidence to sup-
port the necessary inference that "it is more likely than not that [the 
challenged employment decision was] 'based on a discriminatory crite-
61. N.Y. Times, supra note 9, at 44, col. 1 (quoting an unnamed veteran news consultant). 
62. Id. (quoting Jim Cusick, President of a New York news consulting business). 
63. J. GELFMAN, WOMEN IN TELEVISION NEWS 87 (1970) (quoting Gloria Rojas, a New 
York City television news reporter). Barbara Walters confirms that aggressiveness "still is, no 
matter what they say, a dirty word for a woman and an attractive word for a man. A man 
should be aggressive and a woman shouldn't." Id. at 86. 
64. For a discussion of defenses to title VII actions, see Part III infra. 
65. The disparate treatment theory was first articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) ("[Disparate treatment] is the most easily understood type 
of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of 
their ... sex .... "). 
66. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
67. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
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rion illegal under the Act.' " 68 Various sorts of differences in treat-
ment have been held sufficient to constitute a prima facie case. Thus, a 
newscaster may establish a prima facie case merely by showing a dif-
ference in treatment between her and a comparably situated male. 
More directly, she may introduce statements by her employer that ex-
hibit discriminatory intent. Finally, she may demonstrate that an em-
ployer used a survey incorporating gender stereotypes to satisfy 
perceived customer preferences. 69 Given the fact that the burden is not 
onerous, a newscaster who is treated differently because of her sex 
should be able to establish her initial case merely by introducing the 
facts of her treatment. 
2. Disparate Impact 
The disparate impact theory70 focuses on the consequences of a 
particular employment action rather than its motivation.71 The theory 
was first developed in the race discrimination context, where courts 
realized that even facially neutral employment practices could have an 
adverse impact on a protected class.72 To establish a prima facie case 
of disparate impact, a plaintiff claiming sex discrimination must 
demonstrate that an employment practice produces a substantial ad-
verse impact on members of her group because of their sex. 73 Courts 
are very receptive to the use of statistics in disparate impact cases. 74 
68. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978) (quoting International Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 334, 358 (1977)). 
69. See text foJlowing note 98 infra. 
70. The disparate impact theory was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
71. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 ("[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not 
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for 
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability."); see also Blumrosen, Strangers 
in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 
MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972). 
Height or weight requirements are one example of ostensibly neutral standards that are often 
attacked under the disparate impact theory as disqualifying a disproportionate number of female 
job applicants. See, e.g., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); see also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 359. 
72. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Prior to Griggs, courts recog-
nized that faciaJly neutral employment practices could perpetuate the effects of past discrimina-
tion. In Griggs itself, the Court not only upheld this past discrimination rationale, but also 
recognized that neutral practices could result in discrimination because of widespread societal or 
cultural conditions. See Comment, Sex Discrimination: Theories and Defenses Under Title VII 
and BurweJI v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 83 W. VA. L. REV. 605, 611 (1981). 
73. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-31 (1977). 
74. Statistics are an accepted method of proof in title VII cases. See, e.g., Pettway v. Ameri-
can Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 230-31 & n.44 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. lronwork-
ers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir.) ("[T]he often-cited aphorism, 'statistics often teJI much 
and Courts listen,' has particular application in Title VII cases.") (quoting Alabama v. United 
States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.), ajfd., 371 U.S. 37 (1962) (per curiam)), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
984 (1971). See generally Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination 
Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975) (describing accepted tech-
niques of statistical analysis in employment discrimination cases); Note, Employment Discrimi-
456 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:443 
Statistics show that the criteria used by decisionmakers in selecting 
anchors have resulted in gross underrepresentation of older women in 
that position.75 Unfortunately, statistics such as these are difficult to 
formulate for traits more subjective than age, such as appearance or 
demeanor. A prima facie case is made out, however, whenever women 
who possess a certain trait can demonstrate with statistics that they 
are significantly underrepresented in a given occupation as compared 
to men with a similar trait. 
II. THE USE OF VIEWER SURVEYS 
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of sex discrimi-
nation, her employer must "articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason" for the difference in treatment if the plaintiff's theory is 
disparate treatment, 76 or demonstrate a business necessity for the 
practice if the theory is disparate impact.77 It is at this stage of the 
case that defendants have responded to allegations of sex discrimina-
tion by demonstrating that their employment decisions were based on 
the results of viewer surveys.78 Implicit in accepting an employer's 
reliance upon a viewer survey as an appropriate way to rebut a prima 
facie case of sex discrimination is that the survey is free from discrimi-
natory taint. However, a viewer survey may well be discriminatory. 
Even if it is not "designed to effect the removal of [a] plaintiff ... 
because of her sex,"79 the survey may be discriminatory because it asks 
questions that, though facially neutral, engender responses colored by 
nation: Statistics and Preferences Under Title Vil 59 VA. L. REV. 463 (1973) (examining the role 
statistics can play in plaintiffs' attempts to show discriminatory practices by employers). 
75. See Note, Title VII Limits on Discrimination Against Television Anchomomen 011 the 
Basis of Age-Related Appearance, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 190, 190 (1985). 
76. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). All the employer need do is raise a "genuine 
issue of fact as to whether it unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff;" it need not prove that 
it was actually motivated by the explanation offered. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. 
The great majority of disparate treatment cases will turn on the final stage of the proof pro-
cess: whether or not the plaintiff can establish that the employer's purported explanation is in 
fact a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, 
supra note 41, at 14. Comparative; evidence is the crux of the plaintitrs case. Id. at 15. She must 
prove that similarly situated males were treated differently, and that the most plausible explana-
tion for the differential treatment is a discriminatory motive. Cf. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 
804-05 (applying disparate treatment theory to a case involving racial discrimination). 
77. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 1287. 
78. See Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868, 878 (W.D. Mo. 1983), ajfd. in relevant 
part and revd. in part, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied. 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986); Good-
man v. Washington Radio, 29 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1843, 1845, 31 Empt. Prac. Dec. 
· (CCH) 11 33,375, at 28,679 (D.D.C. 1982); Haines v. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc., 32 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1113, 1115-16, 25 Empt. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 31,650, at 19,763-64 
(D.R.I. 1980). 
79. Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 878. According to the district court, a television station is "enti-
tled to rely on the results of [a] survey" unless that survey is designed to result in discrimination. 
572 F. Supp. at 878. 
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the sexual stereotypes of the viewers. 80 Viewer surveys that incorpo-
rate the sex-role expectations of viewers are insufficient to defend a 
claim of sex discrimination. 81 Indeed, the elimination of sexual stereo-
types was one of the important goals of title VII. 82 
Nonetheless, the few courts that have reviewed sex discrimination 
claims of newscasters (all of which have been disparate treatment 
claims) have refused to determine whether the viewer evaluations that 
comprise the surveys are themselves sex based, or, alternatively, to ex-
plain why the use of surveys is legitimate whether or not they reflect 
sex-based attitudes.83 The district court's ruling in Craft v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 84 as affirmed by the court of appeals, provides a ready 
example. In Craft, the district court deferred to the employer in two 
important respects. First, it noted that the defendant's emphasis on 
Craft's dress and make-up was the result of four "focus group" discus-
sions, in which viewers were "overwhelmingly negative" about Craft's 
appearance. 85 Assuming, without analysis, that such reliance was le-
gitimate, it upheld the defendant's actions as nondiscriminatory. The 
court failed to consider whether the survey itself was sex based, or 
whether the viewers brought sexual stereotypes to the viewings and 
thereby tainted the outcome of an otherwise sex-neutral survey. 
The district court was also deferential toward the survey prompt-
ing Craft's demotion, finding it to be a legitimate basis for an employ-
ment decision. 86 The court's decision relied heavily on the concession 
of one of the plaintiff's experts that the survey was "not sex-biased." 
The court failed to determine, however, whether the "expert's" testi-
mony was accurate or sensitive to the various ways in which the sur-
vey could have been discriminatory.87 The court of appeals 
characterized the district court's decision of sex neutrality as one of 
80. For example, a woman might be judged too aggressive by the public while a man exhibit-
ing the same behavior would be praised. See notes 13 & 63 supra and accompanying text. A 
facially neutral question might also ask viewers about the appearance of television newscasters. 
If these viewers deem appearance more important for women than for men, see notes 12, 38 & 61 
supra and accompanying text, women who dress poorly, but who otherwise possess comparable 
skills, will be rated lower than men who also dress poorly. 
81. See notes 2-6 supra and accompanying text. 
82. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
83. See Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 878; Goodman v. Washington Radio, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 1843, 1844, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 33,375, at 28,678 (D.D.C. 1982); Haines v. 
Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1113, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 
~ 31,650 (D.R.I. 1980). 
84. 572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Mo. 1983), ajfd. in relevant part and revd. in part, 766 F.2d 1205 
(8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986). 
85. 572 F. Supp. at 873. 
86. 572 F. Supp. at 878. 
87. 572 F. Supp. at 873-74. The district court's reliance is particularly curious because it 
found that the expert "lacked credentials and experience in the area of broadcasting research." 
572 F. Supp. at 874. 
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fact and affirmed. 88 The appellate court noted that Craft had scored 
poorly on such "sex-neutral" issues as "knowledge of Kansas City, 
journalism ability, and apparent enjoyment of her job."89 However, 
the court failed to inquire (and failed to direct the district court to 
inquire) whether viewers' sex-role expectations had influenced their 
answers to these facially neutral questions. In addition, the appellate 
court ignored testimony accepted by the district court that the defen-
dant's decision to demote Craft was based mostly on her poor ratings 
in such non-neutral categories as appearance and demeanor.90 Rather 
than examining the possible discriminatory effect of the survey, both 
the district court and the court of appeals were satisfied that the sur-
vey was legitimate merely because it was not designed to cause Craft's 
removal on the basis of sex.91 
The nature of widely held sex-role expectations,92 as well as the 
specific observations of news personnel,93 indicate that the sex-based 
stereotypes incorporated in viewer surveys are likely to go beyond 
those considered "reasonable" under title VIl.94 Thus, when the 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case of sex-plus discrimination, a 
court should not allow a television employer to rebut that prima facie 
case simply by showing that viewer surveys were the reason for the 
employment decision. The fact that viewer surveys will usually reflect 
these impermissible expectations should be enough to make them pre-
sumptively invalid as an employment tool, not absolutely valid as 
courts dealing with such surveys have apparently assumed. The bur-
den should be on the employer to prove that the viewer survey is not 
sexually discriminatory. To meet this burden, employers can use so-
88. Specifically, the court of appeals held that the lower court's fact determination was not 
clearly erroneous. 766 F.2d at 1216-17. 
89. 766 F.2d at 1216. 
90. In response to Craft's question concerning why she was being reassigned, the news direc-
tor is reported to have replied that "the audience perceived plaintiff's dress, appearance, makeup, 
and presentation as stumbling blocks." 572 F. Supp. at 874. The court of appeals pointed in-
stead to the fact that in one segment of the survey only four of the fourteen categories concerned 
dress or image, and that Craft trailed her competitors in nearly every category. 766 F.2d at 1209. 
Merely inferential, this evidence is less probative of the actual reason for Craft's demotion than 
the revealing statement of the news director. 
91. 766 F.2d at 1216 (citing the district court's finding, 572 F. Supp. at 878). Craft's case 
had been framed as an intentional discrimination action. The court might also have been reluc-
tant to examine the survey closely because the underlying sex-plus factor - appearance - falls 
on the border of actionable discrimination. See notes 52-59 supra and accompanying text. Had 
the survey asked about viewer reaction to an anchor's marital status - a clear sex-plus factor -
the courts might have examined the survey more rigorously. 
92. See notes 31-38 supra. Sociological studies indicate that sex-role expectations affect an 
individual's evaluation of others. See, e.g., Gerdes & Kelman, supra note 37. 
93. See notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text. 
94. Courts have tried, with varying degrees of success, to distinguish between "reasonable" 
sex-related employment requirements and impermissible sex discrimination. See, e.g., Gerdom v. 
Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982); notes 39-59 supra and accompanying text. 
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phisticated statistical techniques95 along with expert testimony.96 
Since surveys are in fact nothing more than customer preference,97 the 
fact that this proof may be difficult requires that any presumption 
about their use favor the plaintiff, not the defendant-employer.98 
Indeed, the nature of surveys as measures of customer preference 
suggests that their very use in making employment decisions might 
establish the plaintiff's prima facie case of sex discrimination. Unlike 
ratings, surveys are commissioned by the television stations themselves 
and elicit specific responses to individual newscasters. As a result, un-
derlying sex-role expectations and the role of networks in catering to 
them are easily identified. Absent a justification for making employ-
ment decisions on the basis of customer preference and sex-based con-
siderations, television stations, like any other employer, are prohibited 
by title VII from doing so. 
III. THE DEFENSES 
An employer should be able to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case 
by demonstrating that its employment decision was based on a nondis-
criminatory viewer survey.99 If the employer is unable to rebut the 
plaintiff's prima facie case, however, it may seek to justify the use of 
the discriminatory survey under one of the two title VII defenses: the 
bona fide occupational qualification defense or the business necessity 
defense. The emphases of the two defenses mirror the different aspects 
of the two title VII theories. Since a newscaster may potentially estab-
lish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under either of the two 
theories, both defenses are relevant to sex-plus discrimination against 
female newscasters. 
A. TheBFOQ 
The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) is a statutory de-
95. See notes 136-39 infra and accompanying text. 
96. See Taub, supra note 15, at 413 n.318 (noting that expert witnesses can draw on the 
available sociological research to assist courts in identifying stereotype-based employment 
actions). 
97. See notes 2-6 supra and accompanying text. 
98. Arguably, the burden should be on the plaintiff to show that the -employer's use of a 
survey is a pretext for sex discrimination. Under this approach, courts would continue to accept 
the use of surveys as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for disparate treatment or as a busi-
ness necessity, and the plaintiff would have to proffer the sophisticated statistical techniques and 
expert testimony demonstrating that the surveys were sexually discriminatory. 
While this arrangement would improve upon the completely deferential approach now taken 
to the use of viewer surveys, it would ignore certain realities that argue for a different allocation 
of burdens. As already discussed, viewer surveys, by their very nature, ordinarily incorporate 
sexual stereotypes. In addition, the employer surely has greater knowledge concerning the de-
sign and implementation of viewer surveys. Together, these two facts support placing the onus 
on the employer to show that the particular survey used is not in fact sex based, or, alternatively, 
that it is sufficiently job related. 
99. See text following note 94 supra. 
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fense100 to a prima facie claim of disparate treatment. 101 A BFOQ 
allows an employer intentionally to choose employees on the basis of 
their sex or sexual traits when those traits are necessary job qualifica-
tions.102 To take the most obvious example, an employer would admit 
to hiring only females for the job of wet nurse but would argue that 
being female is a necessary qualification for the job. 103 
The BFOQ is recognized as a very narrow exception to title VII's 
general proscription of sex discrimination.104 To establish a BFOQ 
defense to a prima facie case of sex discrimination, an employer must 
demonstrate that being of a certain sex or possessing certain sex-spe-
cific traits is necessary to perform the essence of the job.105 This re-
100. An employer may legally employ an individual on the basis of sex if sex "is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi· 
ness or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1982). 
101. For sources that distinguish the BFOQ and business necessity defenses, see Burwell v. 
Eastern Air Lines, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 949 (1981); B. SCHLEI & 
P. GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 358-60; Comment, supra note 72. 
102. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 
41, at 358-59; see also notes 109 & 118 infra. 
103. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971) (invoking the 
job of wet nurse to illustrate when "sexual characteristics of the employee are crucial to the 
successful performance of the job,'' as opposed to the case before it where the employer claimed 
that females could not perform the job of agent-telegrapher because of the "strenuous physical 
demands"). 
104. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-34 (1977) (adopting the EEOC's narrow 
contruction: "[T]he bfoq exception was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the 
general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex."); EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination 
Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1985); 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (The BFOQ "is a 
limited right to discriminate."). 
105. The court in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), articulated the "essence test" whereby a BFOQ is established only 
when "the essence of the business operation would be undermined" by hiring employees without 
the relevant employment qualification. 442 F.2d at 388 (emphasis in original). This test was 
implicitly adopted by the Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977) 
("The essence of a correctional counselor's job is to maintain prison security."). See also Man· 
hart v. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 587 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated on other 
grounds, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 299 (N.D. Tex. 
1981) ("Diaz's 'essence of the business' rule has now been adopted by every Circuit that has 
considered the matter.") (citing Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1085 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980)). The "essence test" has also been applied in cases 
brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982). See, 
e.g., Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499 
F.2d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). 
Courts have been inexact in distinguishing between the "essence of the business" and the 
"essence of the job." The Court in Diaz focused on the essence of the employer's total business 
operation. 442 F.2d at 388. Subsequent decisions have focused primarily on the essence of the 
particular employment position in question. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 (holding that sex is a 
BFOQ for the job of security guard in a maximum security prison); Sirota, supra note 39, at 
1044-45. The latter position, focusing on the essence of the job, makes more sense because differ-
ent jobs within a single business require different qualifications. Sometimes the essence of the job 
and of the business will coincide since the job is part of the entire business operation. This was 
the point of the Diaz court when it held that the job of flight attendant did not require sex-based 
qualities because the essence of the airline business was to transport passengers. This Note will 
take the same approach in discussing the essence of the job of television newscaster as it relates to 
a television station's business operation. 
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quires a judicial determination of the "essence" of the particular 
job; 106 the employer's characterization of the job is not controlling. 107 
The EEOC guidelines promulgated under title VII recognize that 
sex or sex-related traits108 may sometimes constitute a bona fide occu-
pational qualification in the entertainment industry.109 Indeed, the 
106. In Diaz, the Fifth Circuit rejected the employer's definition of the essence of the job of 
flight attendant as providing a pleasant environment and performing nonmechanical job func-
tions. 442 F.2d at 388. The trial court had found on the basis of the expert testimony of a 
psychiatrist "that an airplane cabin represents a unique environment in which an air carrier is 
required to take account of the special psychological needs of its passengers. These psychological 
needs are better attended to by females." 442 F.2d at 387; see also A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMl~ATION § 15.31, at 4-25 (1985): 
When the seasoned airline traveler goes on to discover that the airline case, in effect, 
rested on the proposition that the essential element contributed by stewardesses was a more-
or-less motherly atmosphere, his smile might well break into a loud guffaw. If this is really 
so, he might ask, why did the airlines have a rigid policy of firing stewardesses at age 32? 
Why did they make any stewardess who might be inclined to gain weight step on the scales 
every two weeks, always with the threat of losing her job if her weight came within twenty 
pounds of that of the heroine of "I Remember Mama?" Above all, if her role was that of 
vicarious mother, why was becoming a real mother the surest way of establishing her lack of 
qualifications for the job? 
(Footnotes omitted). 
107. The Diaz court found that the primary function of an airline business was "to transport 
passengers safely from one point to another." 442 F.2d at 388. The cosmetic and non-mechani-
cal functions performed by flight attendants were found to be "tangential to the essence of the 
business involved." 442 F.2d at 388. 
108. Courts have recognized BFOQs for sex in three additional areas. See Sirota, supra note 
39, at 1059-71. The legitimacy of these BFOQs, however, has been questioned. The first BFOQ 
is for psychosexual requirements. See City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Commn., 7 Pa. Cornrow. 500, 300 A.2d 97 (1973) (holding that counselors of one sex could not 
effectively counsel youths of the other sex about their psychosexual problems). But see Jatczak v. 
Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (employer cannot establish a BFOQ to refuse to 
hire a woman to work in youth workshop for black, male adolescents). 
The second BFOQ is for maintenance of prison security. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 
321 (1977) (refusing to allow women guards to occupy "contact" positions at a violent maximum 
security prison housing male prisoners is within the narrow BFOQ exception). But see Note, 
Dothard v. Rawlinson: Misapplication of the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense, 22 
ST. Loms U. L.J. 197 (1978) (arguing that Dothard was incorrectly decided); Note, Title VII: 
Are Exceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 13 TuIJ;A L.J. 102, 112, 118-20 (1977) (same). 
The third BFOQ is for community standards. See EEOC, TOWARD JOB EQUALITY FOR 
WOMEN 5 (1969) (stating that an employer could restrict jobs to members of one sex "[b]ecause 
of community standards of morality or propriety (restroom attendant, lingerie sales clerk)"). But 
see Edwards, supra note 3, at 417-18 (questioning the legitimacy of a BFOQ based on "morality": 
"What is 'proper' is defined by reference to societal standards of morality. Obviously, this ap-
proach is hazardous."); Sirota, supra note 39, at 1065: 
If Title VII were construed to permit cautious employers to invoke the privacy claim on 
behalf of their customers, traditional employment roles would remain frozen. Since Con-
gress intended Title VII to alter employment patterns as well as prevailing social mores, 
customers should be required to assert their own privacy claim. . . • While the presence of 
members of the opposite sex may initially shock or surprise customers, repeated exposure 
eventually may result in customer acceptance of the new work roles. 
(Footnotes omitted). 
109. In addition to the EEOC's actor and actress exception, see note 110 infra and accompa-
nying text, employers in the entertainment industry may consider sex or sex related traits in 
hiring topless waitresses, models, and escorts. See Developments in the Law, supra note 39, at 
1183-85. 
Prime examples of an employer discriminating among female employees on the basis of their 
sexual characteristics are the Playboy Bunny cases. See, e.g., Playboy Club Intl. v. Hotel & 
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guidelines specifically provide that an employer may discriminate on 
the basis of sex "[w]here it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity 
or genuineness ... e.g., an actor or actress."110 A movie director may 
thus discriminate against men and older women in casting the part of 
a sixteen-year-old girl. Only if the director is allowed this discretion 
will the actress be believable in her role. 111 
"Authenticity or genuineness" does not mean, as a television sta-
tion might argue, merely the ability to appeal to the public. Such an 
interpretation would establish "fulfilling customer preference" as the 
primary function, or "essence," of the newscasting business. Of 
course, catering to the public is, in a sense, the "essence" of most every 
successful business. Similarly, every employer has an interest in hiring 
employees who appeal to the public.112 Nevertheless, title VII specifi-
Restaurant Employees' & Bartenders' Intl., Local 1, 74-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) ~ 8557 
(1974) (Turkus, Arb.) (firing of Bunnies permitted as based not on union activity but on the 
contractual ground of loss of Bunny image). 
An informal EEOC publication specifically recognizes the sex appeal BFOQ: "Jobs may be 
restricted to members of one sex ••. [i]n jobs in the entertainment industry for which sex appeal 
is an essential qualification." EEOC, supra note 108, at 5. However, to constitute a BFOQ, sex 
appeal must be the predominant aspect of the job. See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388·89 (rejecting the 
airline's argument that it should be able to cater to its customers' documented preference for 
female flight attendants: "Before sex discrimination can be practiced, it must not only be shown 
that it is impracticable to find the men that possess the abilities that most women possess, but 
that the abilities are necessary to the business, not merely tangential.") (emphasis in original); 
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (interpreting Diaz to mean 
that "customer preference could 'be taken into account only' ... where sex or sex appeal is itself 
the dominant service provided") (footnote omitted); Sirota, supra note 39, at 1066 (noting that 
"[a] separate sex appeal category creates the danger that employers will include sex appeal as a 
qualification for every job requiring contact with members of the opposite sex"); Developments 
in the Law, supra note 39, at 1183-85 (arguing that in order to establish a sex appeal BFOQ the 
sex appeal aspect of the job must dominate the nonsexual aspects); cf. A. LARSON, supra note 
106, § 15.10, at 4-19 (formulating a slightly different test whereby sex appeal is a BFOQ if "a 
component of sex is a partial ingredient in the distinctive product of the enterprise") (emphasis 
omitted). 
110. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1985). This is the only exception set out in the EEOC guide-
lines to the general prohibition on third-party preference as a BFOQ. The guidelines provide in 
relevant part: 
The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification exception as to sex 
should be interpreted narrowly .... 
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the applica-
tion of the bona fide occupational qualification exception: 
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of coworkers, the em-
ployer, clients or customers except as covered specifically in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. 
(2) Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the Commission 
will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification, e.g., an actor or actress. 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1985). 
111. Even for the purpose of authenticity the BFOQ provision does not justify discrimination 
on the basis of race. According to Senator Clark, speaking during Senate debate on title VII: 
[A] director of a play or a movie who wished to cast an actor in the role of a Negro, could 
specify that he wished to hire someone with the physical appearance of a Negro - but such 
a person might actually be a non-Negro. Therefore, the act would not limit the director's 
freedom of choice. 
110 CONG. REc. 7217 (1964), quoted in Sirota, supra note 39, at 1025 n.4. 
112. Appealing employees become more important as their public visibility increases. Televi-
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cally limits an employer's ability to appeal to the public by prohibiting 
employment decisions made on the basis of sexual stereotypes.113 
Thus, the statutory BFOQ provision does not provide a blanket excep-
tion for jobs with entertainment aspects. Instead, it limits the scope of 
the BFOQ defense for the entertainment industry to situations in 
which the essence of the job is sex-based authenticity or genuine-
ness.114 Though television news contains elements of show busi-
ness, 115 its main purpose is to inform viewers. 116 Because members of 
sion newscasters are, of course, highly visible. Consequently, public appeal is a very important 
quality in a newscaster. However, the degree of public appeal is not the inquiry under title VII. 
Rather, the inquiry is whether that public appeal can be legitimately sex based. See 1981-1982 
Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 24 B.C. L. REv. 47, 265 
(1982) (noting that the courts in Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981), and 
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 960 (1971), 
both recognized "a distinction between a rational customer preference and customer preference 
based on sexual stereotype. . . . [In Wynn] there was no showing that the preference of Wynn's 
foreign customers was rationally based on the company's inability to perform its primary 
functions."). 
113. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 302 n.25 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("South-
west's argument that its primary function is 'to make a profit,' ... must be rejected .•.. Without 
a doubt the goal of every business is to make a profit. . • . If an employer could justify employ-
ment discrimination merely on the grounds that it is necessary to make a profit, Title VII would 
be nullified in short order."); EEOC Dec. No. 70-11, 1973 EEOC Dec. (CCH) 1f 6025 (1969) (the 
argument that an employer must refuse to hire female guards in order to preserve customer 
confidence in security "is, in Jaw, without merit, since it presumes that customers' desires may be 
accommodated even at the price of rendering nugatory the will of Congress."); Sirota, supra note 
39, at 1065 ("Congress intended Title VII to alter employment patterns as well as prevailing 
social mores .•.. "). 
The Supreme Court has implicitly rejected a more broadly stated customer preference excep-
tion. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (citing Weeks with approval); Weeks 
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1969) (criticizing Bowe's broad 
interpretation of the EEOC guidelines); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 362 
(S.D. Ind. 1967) (quoting Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
50 low AL. REv. 778, 796 (1965): "[W]here a woman applies for a job as a barber, the employer 
can establish his case merely by showing that hiring her would cause him to Jose a significant 
number of patrons."), affd. in part, revd. in part, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). 
114. See A. LARSON, supra note 106, § 15.10, at 4-18 (the authenticity consideration comes 
into play when identification with one of the sexes is the job's essential requirement). 
115. See, e.g., B. TEAGUE, LIVE AND OFF-CoLOR: NEWS BIZ 61-62 (1982). The increasing 
show business aspects of television news, especially at the local level, have prompted much de-
bate within the broadcasting industry. See, e.g., Day, Television News: Reporting or Performing? 
in PROBLEMS AND CONTROVERSIES IN TELEVISION AND RADIO 313 (H. Skornia & J. Kitson 
eds. 1968); Dominick, Wurtzel & Lometti, Television Journalism vs. Show Business, 52 JOURNAL-
ISM Q. 213 (1975); Powers, Eyewitless News, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May/June 1977, at 17. 
116. Although the advent of magazine-style television news shows has blurred the distinction 
between television entertainment and news, standard news programs are aimed primarily at 
bringing news to the viewers rather than amusing them. See Note, supra note 75, at 206. The 
appellate court in Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. 
Ct. 1285 (1986), however, refused to address the contention that entertainment-related factors 
such as appearance could be separated from a news program's informational function. In af-
firming the district court's finding that Christine Craft was not subject to sex discrimination 
based on her appearance, the Eighth Circuit wrote: "While we believe the record shows an 
overemphasis by KMBC on appearance, we are not the proper forum in which to debate the 
relationship between newsgathering and dissemination and considerations of appearance and 
presentation - i.e., questions of substance versus image - in television journalism." 766 F.2d at 
1215. 
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both sexes are capable of transmitting information, no BFOQ justifies 
discrimination among newscasters on the basis of sex. 
For actors and actresses in pure entertainment programs to appear 
genuine in their roles, they must often maintain a certain sexual ap-
pearance.117 The job of "newscaster," however, is fundamentally dif-
ferent. Qualities necessary to an "authentic" newscaster correlate to 
sexual characteristics118 only by cultural assumption. 119 These cul-
tural stereotypes are impermissible bases for employment decisions 
under title VII.12° Furthermore, the FCC has mandated equal employ-
117. Although a television station is not constrained by title VII from employing actors and 
actresses to portray sex-stereotyped characters on prime time entertainment programs, such per· 
petuation of sexual stereotypes has been severely criticized. See, e.g., D. MEEHAN, LADIES OP 
THE EVENING: WOMEN CHARACTERS OP PRIME-TIME TELEVISION (1983); Seggar, Television's 
Portrayal of Minorities and Women, 1971-75, 21 J. BROADCASTING 435 (1977). 
118. It is unlikely that a television station would argue that its female newscasters are com-
parable to Playboy Bunnies who may be discharged when they lose their fresh and youthful 
appearance. See note 109 supra. In any event, such an argument would probably not succeed, 
because an employer cannot define its own business for purposes of title VII. See notes 107-08 
supra and accompanying text. 
119. In 1979, television consultant Frank Magid prepared a tabular breakdown of what view-
ers found to be "desirable anchor qualities." The survey compiled results from all over the coun-






















































One handbook cites the following qualities: "(I) professional credentials; (2) thorough prepa· 
ration of significant and interesting copy and actualities; (3) authoritative, confident, credible and 
fluent delivery; and (4) an ingratiating manner." L. DUDEK, PROFESSIONAL BROADCAST AN-
NOUNCING 90 (1982). 
Dan Rather argues that the most essential characteristic of a news anchor is believability: 
Walter Cronkite. David Brinkley. John Chancellor. Harry Reasoner. Mike Wallace. Ed-
win Newman. Eric Sevareid. In looks, voice and approach no two are alike. But there is a 
common denominator. They are believable. No machine known to science can measure the 
human waves that come across the screen. But believability is the test. 
D. RATHER, THE CAMERA NEVER BLINKS 281 (1977). Apparently, there is a second "common 
denominator" in identifying successful anchors; all the anchors mentioned in Rather's quotation 
are men. This revealing fact illustrates how the ostensibly neutral quality of "believability" can 
mask society's sex-role expectations. 
120. "The principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis 
of individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the 
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ment opportunity in the television industry.121 Because of this FCC 
standard, television stations cannot exclude women entirely from the 
job of newscaster. The fact that either sex can fill the position of 
"newscaster"122 indicates that no specifically sexual characteristics are 
essential to the job.123 
The standards of the television industry, and the statements of its 
participants, underscore the differences between newscasting and pure 
entertainment. Television standards distinguish "news" from "en-
tertainment," treating newscasting as requiring professional responsi-
group." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(l)(ii) (1985); see Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Man-
hart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978) ("[E]mployment decisions cannot be predicated on mere 'stereo-
typed' impressions about the characteristics of males or females."); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Assn., 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979) ("[A] justification [that] 'relies heavily on 
stereotypical assumptions [is] a posture which is anathema to the maturing state of Title VII 
analysis.'") (quoting In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d 
1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 1978)), cert denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980). 
Although cultural stereotypes cannot explicitly justify sex discrimination, they may implicitly 
do so when courts fail to recognize the stereotypes as such. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 
U.S. 321, 333, 336 (1977) (Although finding it "impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an 
individual woman or man on the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes," the Court 
held that all women could be disqualified from the job of security guard in a maximum security 
prison because of their "very womanhood."). 
121. See Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast Licen-
sees, 60 F.C.C.2d 226 (1976). The FCC has taken upon itself an independent responsibility, 
apart from the EEOC, to enforce the requirements of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Gott-
fried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297, 309 (D.C. Cir. 1981), revd. in part sub nom. Community Television 
v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983). Moreover, courts have specifically reviewed FCC actions for 
compliance with the Civil Rights Act's standards. See, e.g., Black Broadcasting Coalition v. 
FCC, 556 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam). 
122. One possible way to justify different employment standards for male and female news-
casters would be to establish that the jobs of "male newscaster" and "female newscaster" are, in 
fact, different. The district court in Craft appeared to imply this distinction. It noted that 
KMBC chose to hire a female newscaster "to 'soften' the image of its news presentation," Craft 
v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868, 871 (W.D. Mo. 1983), ajfd. in relevant part and revd. in 
part, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986); that viewer surveys 
compared Craft to the female co-anchors at the competing networks, 572 F. Supp. at 874; and 
that "but for the fact that she is a female, plaintiff would not have been hired as a co-anchor ... 
regardless of her other abilities." 572 F. Supp. at 879. 
Despite these admitted differences in treatment, the Craft trial court insisted that "defen-
dant's actions toward plaintiff during her employment at K.MBC were not based on her sex." 
572 F. Supp. at 879. Thus, although the trial court implied that the role of "female newscaster" 
differs from that of "male newscaster," it explicitly recognized that under title VII the relevant 
comparison involves the treatment of all newscasters regardless of sex. 572 F. Supp. at 879 
(Craft "was a 'co-equal co-anchor.' "). Accepting the trial court's version of the facts, the court 
of appeals affirmed, finding that "Craft was not subject to sex discrimination either in KMBC's 
application of its appearance standard or in its reassignment of her to reporter." 766 F.2d at 
1217. 
123. Sexual characteristics cannot be necessary to the job unless it is first necessary for the 
employee to be a member of a specific gender. For example, the implicit assumption of a require-
ment that an employee have large breasts is that the employee be a woman. See State Div. of 
Human Rights ex rel. Chamberlain v. Indian Valley Realty Corp., App. No. 743 (State Human 
Rights App. Bd. 1970) (the fact that plaintiff was flat-chested caused her not to fulfill the employ-
ment requirement that she wear an "abbreviated" Little Fox cocktail waitress uniform), ajfd. per 
curiam, 38 A.D.2d 890, 330 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1972), reprinted in K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & 
H. KAY, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 634 (1974). 
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bility in presentation and delivery. 124 Network executives attempt to 
disclaim or downplay any show business aspects in the news, as do the 
newscasting anchors themselves.125 According to Bill Leonard, presi-
dent of CBS News, no surveys were used in the choice of Dan Rather 
to succeed Walter Cronkite. 'It was "a news decision."126 Many mem-
bers of the industry now feel that "the emphasis on appearance has 
gone too far in local news."127 
Because sex-specific traits are not necessary to the job of news-
caster, 128 a television employer cannot demonstrate that sex is a 
BFOQ for newscasting employment decisions. Employing sex-role ex-
pectations to determine employment decisions does a disservice both 
to the anchor and to the American public, approximately two-thirds of 
which relies on television news programs as its primary source of 
news.129 A television station, therefore, cannot follow an employment 
policy that adopts sexual stereotypes prohibited under title VII. The 
use of viewer surveys that embody sex-role expectations illegal under 
title VII is one such policy. 
B. Business Necessity 
Business necessity is a court-created defense to the court-fashioned 
doctrine of disparate impact. 130 Where a business practice results in 
an adverse impact on individuals because of their sex, an employer can 
justify that practice under the business necessity defense by demon-
strating that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient function-
ing of its business. 131 For example, an employer may be able to 
establish that a height or weight requirement is a business necessity for 
the job of airline pilot even though the requirement acts to disqualify 
women disproportionately from the job.132 
124. The National Association of Broadcasters Television Code, under subsection V, Treat-
ment of News and Public Events, provides: "A television broadcaster should exercise due care in 
the supervision of content, format, and presentation of newscasts originated by his/her station, 
and in the selection of newscasters, commentators, and analysts." NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
BROADCASTERS, CODE AUTHORITY, BROADCAST SELF REGULATION, TELEVISION CODE 
STANDARD V (1976). ABC's internal standards provide that "[s]taff announcers who are per-
forming as disc jockeys or in other entertainment programming may not read news bulletins 
interrupting such programming." I. FANG, TELEVISION NEWS 221, 224 (1968). 
125. For example, many network executives claim never to have used consultant Magid's 
chart, see note 119 supra, in choosing an anchor. A. WESTIN, supra note 7, at 123. 
126. A. WESTIN, supra note 7, at 123. 
127. N.Y. Times, supra note 9, at 44, col. 5. 
128. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. de11ied, 404 
U.S. 950 (1971). 
129. Note, supra note 75, at 192 n.11. 
130. The business necessity defense was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
131. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 
(1971). 
132. The focus of a business necessity inquiry is not on an explicit sexual classification, like 
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For an employment practice to constitute a business necessity, 
three requirements must be met: (1) the practice must identify quali-
ties that have a "manifest relationship to the employment in ques-
tion;" 133 (2) the compelling business need of using the practice must 
outweigh the discriminatory impact; 134 and (3) there must be no other 
practice that could accomplish the same business purpose with less 
discriminatory impact.135 
It is helpful here to discuss the third prong of the test first. The 
relevant question under this prong is whether viewer surveys can be 
structured to avoid incorporating sex-role expectations that are imper-
missible under title VIl. 136 Researchers have developed a variety of 
techniques for determining the sex-based nature of survey responses. 
For example, factorial surveys allow a researcher to "capture the com-
plexity of real life and the conditions of real human choices and judg-
ments" and to identify the precise factors that shape those choices and 
judgments.137 A television survey could incorporate this technique to 
measure viewer sensitivity to an anchor's sex as a preface to the survey 
itself. Other techniques allow researchers to determine what sex-
stereotyped assumptions are held by a group of respondents. 138 The 
same technique allows those constructing the survey to identify spe-
cific words that are strongly sex-linked.139 Consequently, even if 
viewer surveys are determined to be a necessary tool of the television 
the BFOQ, but on an employment practice that screens for ostensibly neutral job qualifications. 
These job qualifications, however, may effectively correspond to sex. For example, the require-
ment that all employees be over 5'7" disqualifies 95% of the female job applicants, while elimi-
nating only 32% of the men. See Note, Height Standards in Police Employment and the Question 
of Sex Discrimination: The Availability of Two Defenses for a Neutral Employment Policy Found 
Discriminatory Under Title VII. 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 585, 588 (1974). Because of this incidental 
effect, the employer must justify the practice as being necessary to the business. The business 
necessity defense simply recognizes that even though being of one sex per se is not essential to the 
job, a discriminatory impact on one sex may be justified in some situations because a certain 
business practice is essential. 
133. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). 
134. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 
(1971). 
135. Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798; see Note, Business Necessity under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974) (analyzing the concept of 
business necessity). 
136. Courts have defined the type of sex-role expectations that are illegal under title VII. See 
notes 39-59 supra and accompanying text. Survey questions may be designed to identify those 
viewers who possess these stereotypes in a significant enough degree to influence their evaluations 
of newscasters. 
137. Rossi & Anderson, The Factorial Survey Approach: An Introduction, in P. Rossi & S. 
NOCK, MEASURING SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 15, 16 (1982). 
138. See J. WILLIAMS & D. BEST, MEASURING SEX STEREOTYPES 19-27 (1982). See gener-
ally C. BEERE, WOMEN AND WOMEN'S ISSUES, A HANDBOOK OF TESTS & MEASURES (1977) 
(providing a summary of over 200 tests measuring primarily sex-role expectations). 
139. See J. WILLIAMS & D. BEST, supra note 138, at 21-25 (participants in study asked to 
characterize certain adjectives as masculine, feminine, or neither). See generally E. BABBIE, SUR-
VEY RESEARCH METHODS (1973) (discussing generally the problems of using "biased" terms in 
surveys); c. MOSEN & G. KALTON, SURVEY METHODS IN SOCIAL INVESTIGATION 391-408 (2d 
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news business, they need not incorporate sex-role expectations. 140 In 
judging the current blanket approval of all viewer surveys, the issue 
becomes whether the use of potentially sex-biased surveys is a business 
necessity .141 
The determination of whether sexual qualities are "manifestly re-
lated" to job performance is similar to the "essence of the job" inquiry 
of the BFOQ defense. 142 Just as the BFOQ defense fails because sex-
specific characteristics are not crucial to the essence of the job of news-
caster, so the business necessity defense fails because sex-specific quali-
ties are not "manifestly related" to a newscaster's job performance. 143 
Thus, there is no need to cater to the public's sex-based preferences in 
choosing, or imposing requirements on, the individuals who present 
the news. 
Even if a relationship between sex-specific qualities and the job 
performance of newscasters is assumed, 144 the balance between the 
compelling needs of the business145 and the discriminatory impact of 
viewer surveys tips decidedly in favor of the employee. Courts have 
held business practices to be business necessities only where discontin-
uation of the practice appears to threaten the safety or efficiency of the 
ed. 1971) (discussing various causes and potential solutions for response error in surveys, one of 
which is question wording). 
140. The necessity of popularity as the basis for selecting newscasters is itself questionable. 
See Haines v. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1113, 25 Empt. 
Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 31,650 (D.R.I. 1980); Henry, supra note 9 (listing some of the issues raised 
by the Craft case as "the rise of show-business values and market research over news judgment; 
the role of consultants in shaping a newscast's style, cast, and content; the concept of anchors as 
personalities rather than reporters"). 
141. The additional cost of revised survey techniques is no justification for continued dis-
crimination. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir.) ("dollar cost 
alone is not determinative"), cerL dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 
373 F. Supp. 526, 532-33 (E.D. Tex. 1974) ("[T]he expense involved in changing from a discrimi-
natory system ..• [fails to constitute] a business necessity that would justify the continuation of 
... discrimination."); EEOC Dec. No. 72-1293, 1973 EEOC Dec. (CCH) ~ 6356, at 4642 (1972) 
("remedying inequality normally costs money"). 
That cost alone is not determinative finds further support in the recent deletion of language 
from the EEOC Guidelines permitting a BFOQ when the expense for construction of separate 
facilities for men and women would be "clearly unreasonable." 37 Fed. Reg. 6836 (1972) (re-
pealing 30 Fed. Reg. 14,927 (1965)). This language was replaced by a provision that makes an 
employer's failure to construct additional restrooms to provide for equal employment opportu-
nity an illegal practice regardless of the expense. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(5) (1985); see Sirota, 
supra note 39, at 1054. 
142. For an analysis of the BFOQ defense, see note 105 supra. 
143. See notes 117-23 supra and accompanying text. 
144. This is a very large assumption. The only way a television station could relate gender to 
the job performance of newscasters would be to argue that sex appeal is an essential characteris-
tic of the job. This would mean arguing that a newscaster is more akin to a Playboy Bunny than, 
for example, a flight attendant. And, no matter what the argument, a television station cannot 
apply the sex appeal standard more strictly to one sex than the other (i.e., have personality, 
looks, and clothes be more important factors for female than male newscasters). 
145. There is a real issue as to whether the television industry's need to use viewer surveys is 
as compelling as is often claimed. See notes 159-68 infra and accompanying text. 
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business.146 No court has held that a business practice is a necessity 
because a business has a compelling need to hire only individuals who 
meet customer expectations. Indeed, numerous courts have struck 
down business practices designed to mold employees to customers' sex 
stereotypes on the ground that sex-specific qualities were not essential 
to job performance.147 
In sum, regardless of the theory the plaintiff relies on to bring her 
sex discrimination case, no title VII defense justifies the kind of sex-
plus discrimination prevalent in the television news industry today. 
Similarly, no defense justifies the use of viewer surveys that incorpo-
rate impermissible sexual stereotypes in employment decisions. A tel-
evision news employer, like any other employer, cannot discriminate 
on the basis of sex in order to satisfy customer preference. 
JV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF VIEWER SURVEYS 
Certain policy concerns may underlie the current judicial defer-
ence to the television industry's use of viewer surveys in newscasting 
employment decisions.148 First, courts may regard viewer surveys as 
such a fundamental business tool of the television industry149 that they 
consider any judicial scrutiny of survey use to be an unwarranted en-
croachment on management prerogatives. Second, courts may fear 
that the financial loss resulting from any change in survey techniques 
will be catastrophic.15° Finally, courts may doubt whether review of 
viewer surveys is administratively feasible. 
The first policy objection to judicial scrutiny of viewer surveys re-
flects the judiciary's traditional hesitancy to "diminish traditional 
management prerogatives."151 Courts have emphasized that surveys 
146. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 
U.S. 1006 (1971). 
147. See notes 3-6 supra and accompanying text. 
148. See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868, 879 (W.D. Mo. 1983) ("It might 
also be argued broadly that defendant should not have relied on the consultant's report as a basis 
for removing plaintiff as co-anchor, but this is a normative issue not properly before the court 
under Title VII .... "), ajfd. in relevant part and revd. in part, 166 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986). 
149. See, e.g., Haines v. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1113, 
1116, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 31,650, at 19,764 (D.R.I. 1980) ("The news business may 
indeed have its quirks and vagaries ... but consultant's reports and ratings routinely serve as the 
basis for personnel changes."). 
150. See, e.g., Craft, 166 F.2d at 1214 n.11 ("Newscaster grooming 'consistent with commu-
nity standards' as tested by surveys is 'critical to defendant's economic well-being.'") (quoting 
the Craft district court, 572 F. Supp. at 877). 
151. Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); see also Texas Dept. of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1980) (recognizing title VIl's mandate of "fair and ... neutral 
employment personnel decisions," but citing Weber for the need to protect "management prerog-
atives"); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) ("Courts are generally less 
competent than employers to restructure business practices and unless mandated to do so by 
Congress they should not attempt it.''). 
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"routinely serve as the basis for personnel changes."152 However, title 
VII recognizes that certain routine elements of traditional business 
practice may result in sex discrimination and specifically mandates 
courts to intervene in these situations. 153 The loss of discretion to a 
television station prohibited from using sex discriminatory viewer 
surveys is no greater than the loss of discretion, for example, to a small 
local restaurant forced to serve or employ a black, 154 or to a corpora-
tion forced to hire a female despite the claim that its clients prefer 
male companionship at football games and on hunting trips. 155 Fur-
thermore, the scope of title VII limits the encroachment on a televi-
sion station's discretion.156 Under the statute, television stations are 
free to remove newscasters who do not appeal to the public for non-
sex-based reasons.157 That is, title VII does not proscribe the use of 
viewer surveys entirely. It requires only a modification of the current 
business practices of television stations fully consistent with the bur-
dens imposed on other employers.15s 
The second judicial concern, that any restriction on a television 
station's use of viewer surveys in employment decisions would be dev-
astating to the station's financial well-being, may be the result of unex-
amined assumptions about the legitimate business needs of a television 
station.159 First, it must be noted that loss of competitive edge, or 
even potential business failure, cannot alone justify discrimination on 
152. Haines v. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, 32-Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1113, 1115-16, 
25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 31,650, at 19,763-64 (D.R.I. 1980) (noting management's reliance 
on consultant's reports and ratings); see also Craft, 572 F. Supp. at 878 ("The survey was a 
routine procedure •.. conducted, tabulated, and evaluated by persons experienced in the field of 
broadcast research."). 
153. See Sirota, supra note 39, at 1065 ("Congress intended Title VII to alter employment 
patterns as well as prevailing social mores .... "); see also note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
154. See A. LARSON, supra note 106, § 15.40, at 4-32 (noting that the claim of potential loss 
in patronage if forced to serve blacks was "one of the commonest excuses proffered by restaurant 
proprietors"). 
155. EEOC Dec. No. 71-2338, 1973 EEOC Dec. (CCH) ~ 6247, at 4438 (1971) (employer 
cannot refuse to promote a woman to the position of manager on grounds that a manager goes to 
football games and on hunting trips with male customers who would not accept a woman unless 
"built like Raquel Welch"). 
156. Title VII's prohibitions relate only to discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). Furthermore, title VII has been 
interpreted not to apply to certain appearance requirements. See, e.g., Fagan v. National Cash 
Register Co., 481F.2d1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (male employee can be required to wear hair at a 
certain length). Thus the fear expressed by one judge, see Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing, 
Co., 352 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (M.D. Ga. 1972), affd. en bane, 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975), 
quoted in Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1124, that employers will be forced to allow male employees to 
wear dresses is greatly exaggerated. 
157. For example, a television station may undoubtedly require that newscasters maintain a 
professional, businesslike appearance. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215. 
158. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text. 
159. See Note, Evolving Enigma, supra note 32, at 153 ("A court's decision adverse to a 
woman employee ... may represent less some extant misogynist sentiment than a stereotype of 
institutional or business needs."). 
Courts should require documentation of legitimate business needs before deferring to the 
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the basis of sex.160 Nevertheless, if these concerns in fact influence 
judicial decisionmaking, it is important to recognize that claims of 
devastating financial impact are speculative at best. First, claims of 
potential lost revenue resulting from any change in survey techniques 
are far less convincing when viewed in terms of the entire television -
industry. All broadcasters are subject to the same title VII standards. 
Thus any disadvantage imposed on a television station would be short-
lived.161 Second, there remain many other avenues of competition 
open to television stations.162 The current competitive focus of televi-
sion stations on their news "anchors" has been created by the industry 
itself. Such industry-created competition cannot be used to prevent 
imposition of nondiscriminatory hiring practices.163 Third, a television 
station's claim that it must respond to all aspects of viewer taste, even 
though that taste may be based on impermissible sex-role expectations, 
ignores the enormous role television plays in the creation, and thus the 
potential alteration of, societal role expectations.164 
employer's business perogatives. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 
(5th Cir. 1969): 
[T]o rely on the bona fide occupational qualification exception an employer has the burden 
of proving that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that 
all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of 
the job involved. 
(Emphasis added). Indeed, courts have refused to sustain an employer's defense where there was 
no empirical evidence as to the job-relatedness of the asserted qualification. See, e.g., Wetzel v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1974) (finding time limit on maternity leave discrim-
inatory because it makes no provision for individual capabilities), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); 
Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754, 758 (M.D. Ala. 1969) (re-
jecting employer's claim that job requiring rural canvassing could not be filled by women because 
the job might require changing tires and because access to restrooms was limited). 
160. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (quoting 
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 
(1971)): 
[The] necessity test focuses on the company's ability "to perform the primary function or 
service it offers," not its ability to compete .... [A] potential loss of profits or possible loss of 
competitive advantage following a shift to non-discriminatory hiring does not establish busi-
ness necessity . . . . A rule prohibiting only financially successful enterprises from discrimi-
nating under Title VII, while allowing their less successful competitors to ignore the law, 
has no merit. 
See also Sirota, supra note 39, at 1052 n.164 (noting the undesirability of recognizing a "business 
failure avoidance" BFOQ since it would "permit employers to establish differing hiring standards 
based on the financial condition of their respective businesses"). 
Even if the change to a nondiscriminatory practice may result in a partial or complete refusal 
of customers to deal with the business, business necessity is not established. See, e.g., Fernandez 
v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981). 
161. See A. LARSON, supra note 106, § 15.40, at 4-33 (Title VII "has to be interpreted on the 
assumption that it will apply equally to all enterprises competing with each other, and that there-
fore the relative impact of compliance on a firm's business-getting ability will wash out, as all 
other firms are forced to operate under the same constraints."). 
162. For example, style of presentation, story content, length or time of the program, 
number of newscasters. 
163. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 303 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("Southwest 
exploited, indeed nurtured, the very customer preference for females it now cites to justify dis-
criminating against males."). 
164. See generally W. DAVISON & F. Yu, MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH: MAJOR Is-
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Courts should also question whether viewer surveys are an accu-
rate predictor of viewer behavior. 165 Predictions by other employers 
of potential business failure if forced to comply with title VII have 
proved exaggerated. That is, customers have not discontinued their 
patronage after imposition of nondiscriminatory employment prac-
tices.166 Examples of exaggerated claims exist even within the televi-
sion industry itself. Television executives first claimed that viewers 
would not accept female newscasters at all. 167 Now female newscast-
ers have been accepted, 168 and it is the more subtle aspects of employ-
ment decisions that remain potentially discriminatory. In light of the 
history of the television industry, there is little reason to believe that 
this more subtle form of sex discrimination is essential to the presenta-
tion of the news. 
The final policy concern, that judicial review of viewer surveys is 
infeasible, proves unfounded when the method of such review is com-
pared to the judicial inquiry requ4'ed in other title VII cases. 
Although sex-role expectations are deeply imbedded in our society, 169 
courts have demonstrated their ability under title VII to determine 
SUES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS (1974); F. MANKIEWICZ & J, SWERDLOW, REMOTE CONTROL! 
TELEVISION AND THE MANIPULATION OF AMERICAN LIFE (1978); Hicks, Imitation and Rete11-
tion of Film-Mediated Aggressive Peer & Adult Models, 2 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 
97 (1965); Miller & Reeves, Dramatic TV Content and Children's Sex-Role Stereotypes, 20 J, 
BROADCASTING 35-47 (1976). 
165. See Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1216 (8th Cir. 1985) (lack of correspon-
dence between viewer survey predictions and ratings shows not intentional sex discrimination, 
but rather "only that broadcast market research is an inexact science"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 
1285 (1986); Haines v. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, 32 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1113, 
1116, 25 Empt. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 31,650, at 19,764 (D.R.I. 1980) ("One might legitimately 
challenge the reliability of a study of this kind, especially since it is so subjective."). 
Viewer surveys currently compare the newscasters of one station with those of competing 
stations. See, e.g., Craft, 766 F.2d at 1209. They do not purport to measure whether viewer 
preference for stereotyped newscasters is so strong that if not fulfilled, viewers will stop watching 
the news altogether. 
166. See Saenger & Gilbert, Customer Reactions to the Integration of Negro Sales Person11e/, 4 
INTL. J. OPINION & ATTITUDE RESEARCH 57 (1950). 
167. See N.Y. Times, supra note 9. 
168. See id., § 1, at 44, col. 2 (quoting a news consultant to say, "I can find no research that 
we have done that says the audience prefers men over women in anchor roles."). 
169. It may also be argued that the widespread nature of sex-role expectations indicates that 
all transactions between the public and employees of any business will inevitably be tinged with 
sex bias. For example, a salesperson who satisfies customers' sex-role expectations may attract 
more customers and make more sales than a similarly situated salesperson who does not con-
form. The extra sales may lead to preferential treatment for the successful salesperson based on 
stereotyped customer preference. 
Such situations undoubtedly occur frequently without imposition of title VII liability. How-
ever, this is not because title VII sanctions the result, but rather because of the inherent difficulty 
of proving that the reason for the different treatment was stereotyped customer preference. 
If the salesperson adversely affected could prove that the employer had a policy of favoring 
employees who conformed to sex stereotypes, the salesperson could prove discriminatory animus 
on the part of the employer and thereby establish a disparate treatment case. If the salesperson 
could demonstrate a pattern of adverse employment actions and successfully trace their cause to 
the employer's efforts to cater to stereotyped customer preference, the salesperson could establish 
a claim of disparate impact. Again, since there is no method to ascertain whether the public's 
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whether an employment action is indeed sex based,170 and further to 
differentiate impermissible stereotypes from reasonable require-
ments.171 Certainly the subtle influence of sex-role expectations in 
many employment situations is beyond the ability of courts to scruti-
nize.172 But subtle sex discrimination occurs not because the law sanc-
tions it, but because it is difficult to prove. In the newscasting context, 
television stations explicitly rely on customer preference documented 
in the form of viewer surveys. Just as the surveys have thus far formed 
a respected, legitimate defense for television stations, they, coupled 
with expert testimony as to the nature of sex-role stereotypes, can pro-
vide a fact record that enables courts to discern illegal sex discrimina-
tion. Furthermore, the existence of survey techniques that 
compensate for impermissible levels of viewer sex bias provides the 
basis for a judicial remedy, 173 as well as a method for television sta-
tions to protect themselves against allegations of sex discrimination. 
Consequently, the judicial review of viewer surveys mandated by title 
VII is administratively feasible. 
CONCLUSION 
The widespread nature of sexual stereotypes in society indicates 
that sex-role expectations will often influence public reactions to a 
newscaster. Television stations routinely incorporate these public 
evaluations into newscasting employment decisions through the use of 
viewer surveys. The resulting employment decisions therefore present 
potential title VII violations. Because no sex-specific traits are neces-
sary to the job of newscaster, television stations cannot justify explicit 
sex-based employment actions. Furthermore, viewer surveys may fea-
sibly be restructured to eliminate impermissible sexual assumptions. · 
buying habits are based on stereotyped criteria, the case would be virtually impossible to estab-
lish. 
The television industry, however, has an institutionalized policy of measuring and reacting 
directly to viewer preference. Employees evaluated by monitored and tabulated viewer judgments 
are in a better position to demonstrate that the criteria used to judge their performance embody 
sexual stereotypes. A judicial insistence that television stations reveal the underlying criteria of 
employee evaluations is much more fair and feasible than in other business settings since the 
direct measurement of viewer preference is an institutionalized part of television employment 
decisionmaking. 
170. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(examining defendant's assertion that female employees must wear a uniform to reduce dress 
competition among women: "Clearly these justifications for the rule reveal that it is based on 
offensive stereotypes prohibited by Title VII."), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980). 
171. See Taub, supra note 15, at 407-14 (demonstrating that courts have established guide-
lines for differentiating irrational stereotypes from reasonable requirements). 
172. See Taub, supra note 15, at 355 (identifying the reasons that underlying role expecta-
tions are often difficult to discern in evaluations of individuals: "Bias is, first of all, frequently 
unconscious. Second, since the focus is on the individual rather than group performance or 
capability, often the easier explanation is that the individual is at fault. Third, bias is further 
disguised by the expression of judgment in terms that appear both neutral and relevant."). 
173. See notes 136-41 supra and accompanying text. 
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Consequently, a television station cannot justify the use of viewer 
surveys that fail to compensate for sexual bias. Finally, both the po-
tential impact on a television station from imposition of title VII liabil-
ity and the judicial inquiry required to examine viewer surveys is 
comparable to that in other employment discrimination settings. 
Therefore, the content of viewer surveys is a proper, feasible, and nec-
essary issue for courts to review under title VII. 
- Leslie S. Gielow 
